An Education for “Practical” Conceptual Analysis in the Practice of  “Philosophy for Children” by Wolf, Arthur








An Education for “Practical” Conceptual Analysis in the Practice of 
“Philosophy for Children” 
 
 
 Arthur Wolf and Susan T. Gardner 
 
Introduction 
hinking about and inventing concepts is the hallmark of the philosophical endeavor. Concepts 
like fairness, beauty, friendship and knowledge are some of those with a long philosophical 
lineage that start with questions like ‘What is …?’, ‘Why?’, ‘How is it different from …?’ and 
‘Does it then follow that…?’ These questions are crucial, as they set up a relationship between 
concepts and conceptualizers such that practical concept-utilization can be done in better or worse 
ways. In daily life we are constantly confronted with situations that call for inquiries into these big 
topics. Thus, for instance, if I wonder if I should tell him that his new hair-style looks great, while I 
actually think it doesn't, that requires that I work through the concepts of friendship and beauty, as 
well as the concepts of truth and lying. "Should I tell her I think her marriage has taken a wrong 
turn?" "Should I tell him that his breath smells?" Several concepts play a role here even though we may 
not be sure which ones take precedence. Practical engagement with concepts through questions, in 
other words, matters. 
 
In what is to follow, we will suggest that practical conceptual analysis, despite its sophisticated 
philosophical vibe, is, in fact, the responsibility of all of us as we go about our everyday lives. If this so, 
then it follows that those who are interested in practical educational strategies, such as those in the 
field of Philosophy for Children (P4C), need to have a “working view” of concepts, not only so that 
they can pass on that view to others, but also so as to empower the facilitator and, as a consequence, 
the Community of Philosophical Inquiry (CPI)—the pedagogical cornerstone of P4C.   
 
We will undertake such an exploration here, while attempting to skirt the particular ins and 
outs of the philosophical landscape with regard to what precisely concepts are, such as: are they 
mental representations or images, can they be defined by necessary and sufficient conditions, or are 
they prototypicals. We will, in other words, rather than exploring the heavens of academic 
philosophical discourse with regard to concepts, explore how the practical application of value 
concepts, that is, those that underwrite individual behavior, can go well or poorly. In so doing, we 
presume that we will make the case that quality education for such concept application is imperative.  
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Along the way, it will become evident that the sort of dialogue that is undertaken in a CPI can 
be precisely the sort that serves as practice for real-world value-concept application. As well, we will 
suggest that there are certain kinds of questions, namely those that both establish a precise context, 
while simultaneously “laddering-up” into target concepts, that are optimal for giving practice in real 
world value-concept application. We will further argue that, precisely because competent value-
concept application is so essential for both individual and collective well-being, that a deeper more 
flexible view of a target concept can be used as a measure of the degree to which a CPI can be judged 
as fruitful.  
 
With regard to the set-up of what is to follow, we will begin with an outline of the basic 
distinction between concepts that emerge as a result of physical world interaction (baseline concepts) 
and those that emerge as a result of social interaction (value concepts); we will then analyze how the 
application of value concepts can go well or poorly; and finally, we briefly offer ways in which a CPI 
(with some tweaking) can be particularly valuable in nudging participants into being more competent 
in this life-altering practice of value-concept application. So let us begin. 
 
Two Kinds of Concepts Corresponding to Two Kinds of Selves 
In what is to follow, we suggest that much traction can be gained in understanding the human 
conceptual framework, as well as the degree to which individuals can be considered responsible for its 
use, if we categorize human concepts as a function of our two kinds of selves: our physical selves, 
which we will call 'inter-world' selves and our social selves, which we will call 'inter-personal' selves. 
That is, we will argue that qualitatively different kinds of concepts emerge as a function of our 
different kinds of selves. We will deal with these in turn.  
 
Inter-World Selves: Base-line Concepts 
 
Let us start our exploration at what might be conceived as the developmental dimension of 
the physical self or inter-world self. That is, we will presume that the capacity to conceptualize in the 
sense of organizing perceptions, emerges in a trajectory that is virtually simultaneous with the capacity 
to sense stimuli1. Indeed, it could be argued that the very notion of stimuli makes little sense unless it 
is presumed to be undergirded by conceptualization, which can be characterized as the capacity to 
organize stimuli in such a way that “similar ways of responding are elicited by similar stimuli” (i.e., 
classical conditioning)—a notion not dissimilar from an abilities view of concepts (Dummett; Kenny). 
In other words, the foundation of this exploration rests on Kant’s precept that: “Percepts without 
concepts are empty, concepts without percepts are blind.”2  
 
The implications with regard to understanding the emergence of conceptualization this way are 
many. To begin with, it follows that the capacity for conceptualization is not a function of linguistic 
ability. That is, since non-linguistic animals can clearly perceive food, fire, trees, predators, and so 
forth, if we apply Kant’s dictum, it follows that they clearly have the ability to view their environment 








through a conceptual grid. Though this reference to non-linguistic animals is somewhat tangential to 
the exploration here, it is nonetheless important as it reminds us to be alert to the fact that many 
human concepts arise in a manner not dissimilar to that of our non-linguistic animal friends, namely, 
as a result of our embodied encounter with the environment (a thesis congruent with what Shapiro 
refers to as an embodied mind thesis). As with other animals, our concept of a tree as a solid entity, for 
example, emerged as a function of the fact that we cannot walk through it. As a result of this embodied 
mind thesis, we can also presume that conceptualizing entities who have similar bodies and who 
inhabit similar environments, will use fairly similar conceptual grids to organize their base-line 
experience of the world, with base-line referring to concepts that inevitably arise given bodily-
environmental interaction. It is on this basis that we can presume that, with regard to base-line 
concepts, all humans have similar concepts: all humans will form a concept of fire that will be 
informative of the fact that a close encounter can result in burns. Importantly, it must be kept in 
mind, following Damasio, that all these concepts are “somatically marked” (175), meaning that they 
are perceived as having more or less positive or negative importance for the animal. Gardner (Thinking 
Your Way to Freedom) describes how this somatic marking can impact animal behavior in the following 
way: 
This value/behavior dialectic can be illuminated through an analogy with color. Let us 
suppose that all animals are pre-programmed so that red is appetitive (i.e., red elicits an 
approach response) and blue is aversive (i.e., blue elicits an avoidance response). With 
association, red and blue rub off on various objects and situations so that, with extensive 
experience, an animal’s environment becomes a riot of color with many shades and 
variations of red, blue, and purple. Were we to have the appropriate metaphysical glasses, 
we would be able to predict an animal’s behavior merely by seeing the colors of its world. 
We would know, for instance, that a vibrant red would be extremely appetitive, a pale 
blue mildly aversive, while we would predict that a deep purple would elicit a highly 
ambivalent response. (13) 
 
Finally, following Kant’s reasoning in the Transcendental Deduction, we can presume that any 
entity who perceives objects as a function of the capacity to conceptualize, must, thereby, also have a 
sense of self—at least in the sense of being aware of the self as an embodied agent, such as a self whose 
body is such that it cannot walk through trees; a self that we are referring to here as an inter-world self. 
 
Inter-personal Selves: Interpersonal-Value (Practical) Concepts 
 
Humans are not merely conscious animals. Unlike most of our other animal friends, we are 
also self-conscious. To understand the degree to which different kinds of concepts emerge as a result 
of the emergence of self-consciousness, let us turn to the account of the emergence of self-
consciousness, or what might be referred to as the emergence of the social or inter-personal self, 
according to George Herbert Mead, as depicted by Susan Gardner in her article “Taking Selves 
Seriously” (2011). According to Mead, self-consciousness emerges as function of an 








…emerging awareness that there is a correlation between the changing affect (or response) of the 
other and particular units of one’s own behavior. A young child, in other words, becomes aware 
of her actions through the fact that a change in the behavior, verbal response, and/or attitude of 
the other sends the message that her actions are positively or negatively valued by that other. 
Thus, according to Mead, self-consciousness, rather than being some mysterious metaphysical 
exudate of the brain, is rather an awareness of one’s behavior through the fact that it is valued 
either positively or negatively by others. (emphasis added, 81) 
 
What Mead is saying, then, is that self-consciousness as such quite literally develops because of, 
and only because of, social interaction. Without interaction, in other words, there would be no self-
consciousness—a theory, by the way, that is empirically supported by experiment carried out by Gallup 
who showed that the self-consciousness evident in chimps as measured by mirror-related activities is 
absent in chimps that are raised in isolation. (emphasis added, Gardner, “Taking Selves Seriously” 81) 
 
Entities who are self-conscious, in other words, can be described as entities who organize their 
behavior with respect to interpersonal values—in contrast to and in addition to inter-world values—
that are borrowed from prominent others in their social milieu; for example, that such-and-such 
behavior is considered rude, or courageous, or fair, and so on. It is in this sense, then, that self-
conscious entities can be described as having a qualitatively different layer of concepts that impacts 
their organizational responses. Let us refer to these concepts that emerge as a result of social 
interaction as interpersonal value concepts, or pace Kant, simply as practical concepts, in contrast to the 
base-line concepts that emerge as a result of base-line interactions between the body and its physical 
environment.  
 
What is important to note with regard to these different-in-kind concepts is that, with regard to 
base-line concepts, there is no choice in the matter: the concept of fire will inevitably contain the 
notion of potential harm. With regard to interpersonal values, however, here are several degrees of 
latitude for variance. To begin with such variance might be a function of the strength or weakness of 
the justificatory apparatus that supports concept application. That is, you and I can disagree as to 
whether a particular act of behavior is or is not cowardly by offering reasons in support of our views. 
We can think here of Garcin, the protagonist in Sartre’s No Exit. He tried desperately to convince his 
“hell-mate” that, even though he ran from war, he had a good reason for doing so, since he was, after 
all, a pacifist. Secondly, even if we agree on the concept application, we might nonetheless disagree 
with regard to its degree of blame- or praiseworthiness, or its “depth of color”: what you consider 
inexcusably rude (a deep blue), I might view as simply an innocent “faux pas” (closer to a pale purple) 
(see reference to color in Gardner above). Thirdly, how a practical concept is appropriately applied 
also depends very much on context, which, of course, can be infinitely variable. Thus, while “a rose is 
a rose is a rose”3 regardless of context, the application of value concepts is essentially context-
dependent. Such context-dependency ought not to be considered a defect but instead, following 
Habermas, is a necessary condition for the normal use of language: “In everyday communication an 








utterance never stands alone; a semantic context accrues to it from the context the speaker 
presupposes that the hearer understands” (125). 
 
This fact, that the analysis and application of value concepts can vary widely, is the source of the 
call to account. That is, to the degree that practical concepts can have a considerable impact on the 
actions of the conceptualizer, and to the degree that a conceptualizer can have at least some degree of 
“reasonable” control over the design of her conceptual lens, to that degree it can be argued that we 
conceptualizers have a responsibility, both collectively and individually, to ensure that the manner in 
which we apply concepts can indeed by justified.  
 
Practical Conceptual Analysis 
 
The Unmooring  
 
It is important to emphasize that this claim that conceptual analysis and application is the 
responsibility of all agents refers only to a given set: there are only some concepts over which any 
conceptualizer has any control. As has already been mentioned, concepts that arise as a result of 
mind-physical world interactions are concepts over which an embodied conceptualizer has little or no 
control. What is interesting about this sort of rigid mind-world conceptual grid is that it may very well 
inform a person’s “concept of concepts,” that is, a conceptualizer may assume that concepts are 
categorizations over which a conceptualizer has little control. Thus, for instance, a conceptualizer 
might assume, as is quite typical of children, that something is or is not fair, or that something is or is 
not just, as a result of some sort of conceptual fiat, in the same way that a thing is or is not a tree.  
 
This is where the imperative that one gain control over the analysis and application of one’s 
practical concepts first finds breath. Conceptualizers, not just philosophers, need to understand that 
there are some concepts that are up for grabs, and that the interpersonal value concepts that guide 
their own behavior are precisely the sort that fall into this category.4 And conceptualizers need to 
understand how relevant this is to their own lives. They need to understand, in other words, that to 
the degree that they can be held responsible for their own behavior, and to the degree that practical 
concepts guide that behavior, and to the degree that practical concepts are indeed up for grabs, it 
follows that, to that degree, conceptualizers can be held responsible for how they construe such 
concepts.  
 
The first step to enhancing conceptual agency, in other words, is to unmoor practical concepts 




The mirror image of viewing interpersonal value concepts as authoritatively rigid is to view 
them as up for grabs in an anarchical sense. That is, so the reasoning goes, if the meaning of such 








concepts is not locked in, then surely it is entirely up to individual whim as to how such concepts 
should be applied. This movement from “all to nothing” may indeed be the source of what appears to 
be wide-spread contemporary subjectivism, or what Matthew Crawford calls, in his book, The World 
Beyond Your Head: On Becoming an Individual in an Age of Distraction, rampant “moral autism” (184).  In 
supporting his view, Crawford cites a 2008 study done by Notre Dame sociologist Christian Smith 
that investigated the moral views of 230 young American adults. Smith’s findings were summarized as 
follows:  
 
Many were quick to talk about their moral feelings but hesitant to link these feelings to any 
broader thinking about a shared moral framework. . . As one put it, “I mean I guess what makes 
something right is how I feel about it. But different people feel different ways, so I couldn’t 
speak on behalf of anyone else as to what’s right and wrong”. (183) 
 
This “fixed to anarchical” swing with regard to conceptual application, interestingly, mirrors a 
not uncommon philosophical assumption with regard to fact and value: that value concepts are 
somehow basically meaningless since an evaluative conclusion cannot be inferred from factual 
premises.  
 
What we want to argue here, by contrast, is that the degree of legitimacy of practical concept 
application is a function of the objectivity of the process.5 That is, just as the legitimacy of the 
application of many factual concepts, in science for instance, is very much a function of the objectivity 
with which the evidence is evaluated, so, we argue, the application of value concepts is very much a 
function of the objectivity of the reasoning process.  
 
In order to elaborate on this notion of “objectivity in reasoning,” we will turn first to Jürgen 
Habermas and then to Stephen Darwell, both of whom argue that objectivity in reasoning is a 
function of a very particular kind of interpersonal dialogue.  
 
Objectivity and Interpersonal Dialogue 
 
Habermas takes issue with the notion that objectivity (what he refers to as rationality) can be 
approximated by any kind of solitary intrapersonal purely logical thought (pace Kant)—a view famously 
concretized by Rodin’s Thinker. Habermas argues, by contrast, that rationality (or objectivity) can only 
be achieved through interpersonal dialogue of a certain sort, namely one in which a valuer is prepared 
to expose her “reasoned” value claim to the critique of opposing viewpoints.  Thus, in his book, The 
Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas says:  
 
Anyone participating in argumentation shows his rationality or lack of it by the manner in 
which he handles and responds to the offering of reasons for or against claims. If he is “open to 
argument,” he will either acknowledge the force of those reasons or seek to reply to them, either 
way he will deal with them in a “rational” manner. If he is “deaf to argument,” by contrast, he 








may either ignore contrary reasons or reply to them with dogmatic assertions, and either way he 
fails to deal with the issues rationally. (18) 
 
Habermas is arguing, in other words, that “We must be willing to test with reasons and only 
with reasons whether the claims defended by the proponent (including ourselves) rightfully stand” 
(25). The most prominent implication of Habermas’ view is that the estimation of the legitimacy of 
practical concept application requires that we dialogue with one another in a fairly intimate manner.  
 
If we take Habermas’ reference to “meaning” as similar to what we are here referring to as 
interpersonal value concepts, then the following quote is particularly germane to the argument 
presented here. He says that “Understanding meaning differs from perceiving physical objects: it 
requires taking up an intersubjective relation with the subject who brought forth the expression” (111). 
He goes on to say that “[t]o understand, one must become a potential member of that individual’s 
lifeworld”; and that “Objectively, I can hear noises, but once I genuinely understand, then what is 
said is something that can be true of false. I am then challenged to react with a ‘yes’ or ‘no.’ It 
becomes a comment on our common world” (112). 
 
Habermas, thus, suggests that a necessary condition of legitimate value concept application is a 
willingness to engage in a kind of interpersonal reasoning that requires that we listen to views that 
may be different from our own. Darwell fleshes out this notion by arguing that such an interpersonal 
reasoning process requires that we presuppose an objective standard that adjudicates as to what does 
and does not count as a good reason in any given situation—an attitude which he calls taking “a 
second-person stance.” Thus, in his book The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, And 
Accountability Darwell argues that “to enter into the second-person stance and make claims and 
demands of one another at all, you and I must presuppose that we share a common second-personal 
authority, competence, and responsibility simply as free and rational agents” (5). This “exchange thus 
involves reciprocal acknowledgment of norms that govern both parties and presupposes that both 
parties are mutually accountable, having an equal authority to complain, resist coercion, and so on” 
(48). And he goes to say, quoting Petit and Smith (1996) that “in taking up the conversational stance, 
both must assume (1) that there are norms that govern what each should believe, (2) that each can 
recognize these norms, that each is capable of guiding their beliefs by them” (433). 
 
Darwell argues, as well, that to engage in such an interchange is to accord that other what he 
refers to as “recognition respect,” which he distinguished from “appraisal respect,” with the latter 
being characterized by a form of esteem. Recognition respect, by contrast is not about appraisal but 
how our relations are to be regulated (123). Recognition respect, in other words, allows me to 
vehemently disagree with your position, even to find it abhorrent, and yet to nonetheless engage with 
you in reasoned dialogue; which emphasizes again the degree of intimacy and commitment necessary 
for genuine dialogue. 
 








In contrast to relationships of power, genuine interpersonal reasoning, or what Darwell calls 
second-personal interaction, requires the assumption on the part of all participants that the win is a 
function of the relative strength of reason-offerings and not a function of the desired outcome on the 
part of any one participant. And in that vein, Darwell argues, quoting Fichte, that we need to be alert 
to the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate forms of address with the former being 
characterized “summoning” the other’s will, as opposed to “impermissible ways of simply causing 
wanted behavior” (Darwell 21), i.e., that second-personal address is reason-giving in its nature. It 
differs fundamentally from coercion in that it seeks to direct a person through her own free choice, 
and in a way that recognizes her status as a free and rational agent. It is, as it were, an attempt to 
guide rather than goad (Darwell 49). 
 
Contextualization and de-contextualization 
 
Though Habermas and Darwell have much to give us in terms of understanding how 
objectivity is possible with regard to value concept application, we need to be aware that we are not, as 
a result, seduced by a scientific or “universal” aura to such an extent that we fail to take account of the 
importance of being sensitive to context, to differing interpersonal perspectives, and to the “lives of 
concepts.”  Concepts do not operate in a vacuum but instead interact with other concepts, with the 
context, and as well, change as a result of interpersonal interaction.  
 
With regard to context, Lipman (Thinking in Education) puts it this way: “[a]dvocates of better 
thinking have usually pointed out that [critical] thinking would generally involve an intense sensitivity 
to contextual individuality” (208) and that “readers must master the contextuality of meaning” (146; 
see also 224-225). We must always keep in mind, in other words, that contexts, even those that seem 
remarkably similar, virtually always have aspects or nuances that differentiate it from others. It is for 
that reason that, when we engage in thinking about concepts, we need to undertake a kind of dance 
that alternates between the context and concept, or between one contextualization or another. 
Moving first to contextualization, one might ask, “Was Garcin a coward because he refused to fight in 
his particular situation?” and then to a de-contextualization, “What is a coward?” and vice versa. This 
dance enriches both the context and the concept which, in turn, is also enriched by the interchange 
between conceptualizers. Thus, while Estelle buys Garcin’s argument about pacifism: “no one could 
blame a man for that” (81), Inez puts that view into question when she says, “No doubt you argued it 
out with yourself, you weighed the pros and cons, you found good reasons for what you did. But fear 
and hatred and all the dirty little instincts one keeps dark—they're motives too” (81).  
 
Thinking about concepts, then, requires a dance between interlocutors and between contexts 
and concepts. It requires an inquisitive attitude, a willingness to interrupt expectations, 
experimentation. It requires a certainty that, despite the importance of concept application in guiding 
behavior, and despite the possibility of objectivity through reasoned exchange in a public forum, one 
will never quite be certain, inquiry will always be necessary, and ultimately the dance will never end.  








Summary Thus Far 
 
In summary, then, it has been argued that, while the opposite of a rigid application of value 
concepts (in a manner similar to the application of base-line concepts) would appear to be anarchic 
subjectivism, there is a third alternative, namely objective anchoring via second-personal dialogue—an 
anchoring which nonetheless ought not to constrain the contextual/de-contextual dance necessary to 
gain an adequate view of practical concept application in any particular situation.  This combination 
of objectivity and conceptual dance ensures that, despite the dance, the concept doesn’t become 
“unhinged” with every differing opinion. This objectivity of process also has a fundamental impact on 
those conceptualizers who are willing to so engage. More specifically, from a Habermasian point of 
view, such individuals are worthy of considering themselves as genuinely “rational,” and from a 
Darwellian point of view, such individuals are worthy of genuine respect, not only in the sense that 
they are willing to grant such respect to others, but as well, because they are willing to take 
responsibility for how they apply value concepts, as well as holding others to account. They are, as it 
were, willing to take responsibility for how they see the world. Matthew Crawford puts it this way: 
“Arguably, what it takes to be an individual is to develop a considered evaluative take on the world, 
and stand behind it” (184)—though, of course, not in the sense of having a static view but rather in 
the sense of being prepared to make a commitment to a view while nonetheless remaining open to 
the possibility of “dancing further.”  
 
Education for Practical Conceptual Analysis 
 
If it is true that consistently engaging in practical conceptual analysis and application is the 
responsibility of all agents, and if it is true that engaging in second-personal dialogue is a necessary 
condition for doing this well, then it follows that, if we are to educate for competent practical concept 
application, then educators need to have a vision of the sort of mind that needs to be cultivated so 
that agents may become competent practical conceptualizers. We suggest this vision be informed by 
the following: 
(a) a fundamental inclination, or motivation, to get the application of value concepts right, particularly 
with respect to context, in the sense of recognizing that such application underwrites 
behavior, and hence the identity of all concerned;   
(b) a fundamental understanding of concept application in the sense of recognizing both that the 
application of contextualized value concepts requires reasoned negotiation in public space, 
along with contextualization and de-contextualization, and that the outcome of such a 
negotiation is a function of reason, not the reasoners involved;  
(c) a fundamental attitude toward the process of concept application in the sense of being open to 
reasoned alternatives to one’s own and showing an intense sensitivity to context;  
(d) a fundamental skill in the sense of acquiring an understanding of the basic moves of 
contexualization/de-contextualization, as well as the sorts of logical essentials that are 
necessary to distinguish between good and poor reasons that support the various 
perspectives.  








All of the above can be enhanced through education. Here we will argue that the worldwide 
educational initiative of Philosophy for Children (P4C), because of its process and format, is 
particularly well placed to excel in enhancing the fundamental motivation, understanding, attitude 
and skills that are necessary for individuals to become competent and responsible value 
conceptualizer. This framework also, intriguingly, offers an interesting way to measure the degree to 
which a philosophical inquiry is a success.   
 
The CPI Process 
 
With regard to process, the modus operandi of Philosophy for Children is the Community of 
Philosophical Inquiry (CPI). Within a CPI, participants engage in a facilitated inquiry with regard to 
the issue at hand. It is because of this facilitation—one that is (or ought to be) rigorous and often 
deeply involved with regard to the process rather than content, that a CPI can be said to provide the 
garden in which the sort of optimal dialogue, of which Habermas and Darwell speak, can flourish. 
Ann Margaret Sharp, one of the founders of the P4C movement, describes the Community of 
Philosophical Inquiry in the following way: “this education is an education in procedural principles 
(as contrasted with substantive principles) that can help young persons move towards objectivity, 
…When I use the term 'objectivity', I mean an inter-subjective truth arrived at by human beings 
through inquiry, experimentation, consideration of the evidence and dialogue” (39-40). 
 
Much has been written about the importance of facilitator transactions in this regard, 
(Gardner 1995; Kennedy 2004; Gregory 2007), so we will not labor this point here except to say that, 
with regard to the fundamentals that are needed for engaging in “second personal dialogue” in the 
interests of competent practical concept application, a competently run CPI underwrites both “c” 
(attitude of openness) and “d” (reasoning skills) above. That is, in a CPI, since participants must inevitably 
listen to opposing points of view, and since such a CPI can be enormously invigorating to all 
concerned, this experience serves as a positively reinforcing practice of being open to alternatives 
other than their own (“c” above).  As well, to the degree that a facilitator is keenly attuned to the logic 
that underpins various claims, such as hidden assumptions, counter-examples, etc., and to the degree 
that problematic logical issues are made evident, to that degree participants learn that some reasons 
can be judged as better or worse than others, not on the basis of who made the claim, but on the basis 
of the degree to which they can withstand logical challenge (“d” above) (though, of course, a case can 
be made that, aside from participating in CPI’s, participants could benefit enormously from receiving 
direct instruction with regard to learning logical essentials that help to distinguish good from poor 
reasoning) (Gardner 2015).   
 
The CPI Setup 
 
But what about “a” and “b,” the motivation to get the application of value concepts right, as 
well as the understanding that legitimate concept application is a function of reasoned negotiation in 
public space? Here the set-up of the CPI matters. 








The typical set-up for a CPI is one which begins with a stimulus of some kind, such as a story, 
which is then used to elicit questions about which participants wish to inquire (Gregory; Weber & 
Wolf). Though this format seems simple, it can be the source of much difficulty for facilitators, as it 
may be that relatively few of the suggested questions are appropriate for inquiry. In an effort to help 
facilitators in avoiding the pitfall of attempting to anchor an inquiry with a non-inquiry question, a 
number of authors have offered characterizations of the sort of question that should be avoided, e.g., 
questions whose answers can be found in the text, questions whose answers need expertise, questions 
whose answers is up to anyone’s imagination (Cam), questions that already have definitive answers, 
empirical questions, religious/mystical questions (Gregory), Google questions, silly questions, “it 
doesn’t much matter” questions (Dumas). 
 
Here, we would like to add to the latter a positive suggestion that emerges from the present 
focus on practical conceptual application. That is, while certainly avoiding non-inquiry questions, we 
would like to suggest that facilitators ought to be particularly alert to context specific questions that have 
the potential to ladder into target value concepts. Examples of such questions might be the following: Was 
it unfair for Johnny not to share his homework with Sally? (targeting the concept of fairness), or, after 
reading Anansi and the Moss Covered Rock, a question as to whether it was alright for Little Bush Deer 
to deceive Anansi, since Anansi had deceived others (targeting the concept of deception 
(Wartenberg).  
 
We suggest this for the following reasons. Though we have argued that becoming competent in 
value concept analysis and application is a responsibility of all agents, clearly learning about concept 
analysis and application in and of itself, such as what is it to be fair or what counts as being a coward, is 
virtually unintelligible. As mentioned above, the potential for concept application varies widely, 
potentially infinitely, as a function of context, justificatory support, and purported “colour.” Referring 
again to Lipman (Philosophy Goes to School) with regard to context, he says that: 
 
 Students should be able to recognize how assertions change their meanings—and possibly their 
truth values—when applied to a variety of contexts. Thus in asserting that something is true, one 
should be prepared to say under what circumstances it might be false and vice versa (214).  
 
It is because of this essential variability that no rule book will do with regard to the analysis and 
application of value concepts; these are not knowledge factums. And it is precisely for this reason that 
it is being argued here that agents need to become competent in the reasoning process through which 
any given practical concept might be applied in any given specific situation. Thus, we suggest that if a 
CPI begins with a context specific question that targets a specific value concept, the resulting inquiry will 
indeed be the sort through which participants gain practice in the process of practical concept 
application.  
 
To elaborate further by way of example, let us suppose that from a class of elementary school 
youngsters, after reading together “Dragons and Giants” from Frog and Toad Together, the following 








sorts of questions (suggested by Wartenberg) become the focus of inquiry: Are frog and toad brave 
even though they jumped away? or Was it wrong for frog and toad to run away? or Was toad brave 
even though he was shaking with fear? Thereafter, in the ensuing CPI, youngsters can reflect together 
on whether there was a time when any of them ran away when maybe they shouldn’t have, or whether 
there was a time when they were shaking with fear but nonetheless stood their ground. It is thus 
precisely through such communal inquiry into the fluid nature of concept application that youngsters 
(a) actually get practice in negotiating such application, (b) experience the exhilaration of recognizing 
that there are better and worse ways to describe such situations, and (c) begin to understand that 
getting a more accurate take on how such concepts are applied actually matters. It is in this sense, 
then, that a CPI that is set up in this way can nurture “a” and “b” above, i.e., (a) that motivation for 
getting the application of value concepts right will be enhanced and (b) a fundamental understanding 
of the process of concept application in the sense of recognizing that the application of value concepts 
requires reasoned negotiation in public space that is highly sensitive to context. 
 
It is important to keep in mind with regard to the suggestion of anchoring a CPI based on a 
context specific question that targets a specific value concept that the value of the original question and the 
value of the resulting conceptual analysis are interdependent. On the one hand, the original question 
of whether or not Frog and Toad are brave is fruitful precisely because it ladders easily into the 
concept of bravery and thereby gives participants an opportunity to play with concept application not 
only in various alternative potentially personal scenarios, but with altering minutia (e.g., were they in 
mortal danger, did they think they were in mortal danger, should they have established whether or 
not they were in mortal danger, etc.) and in so doing, it alerts participants as to how complex value-
concept application really is. On the other hand, however, the original question, precisely because of 
its precision, serves as a magnet to “corral in” the discussion so it doesn’t wing off into infinite 
ruminations that would, in real life, paralyze practical reasoning.  
 
The above, then, serves as a suggested guide to facilitators for picking and/or formulating “good 
questions” by which to anchor a CPI, namely those that are precise enough to keep the inquiry within 
an intelligible range, but that nonetheless ladder up into target concepts; it is the tension between 
these two that will afford participants an exhilarating practice in the vagaries of competent concept 
application.  
 
The Measure of Success 
 
Measuring the degree to which a CPI is successful has been an on-going challenge for 
Philosophy for Children. Valiant attempts have been made by many with regard to measuring specific 
moves that are undertaken in Communities of Inquiry; attempts to measure whether, for example, 
there are consecutive peer-to-peer exchanges uninterrupted by the teacher, or whether the teacher 
does not miss opportunities to ask students to explain and support their positions with reasons, 
examples, and evidence, etc. (Reznitskaya). Though such attempts are admirable and inspiring, they 
are beyond the scope of most individual facilitators. 








By contrast, this focus on conceptual analysis, along with its companion notion of laddering 
questions, will help the facilitator informally measure the degree to which a CPI has been fruitful.  
That is, facilitators might first ask themselves if the inquiry was anchored in a precise or “situated,” 
laddering question, and then, whether the ensuing inquiry did indeed result in a more complex, 
nuanced, riveting understanding of the concept in question. If the answer is yes on both counts, then 
it seems to us that the facilitator can give herself credit for nudging her co-inquirers toward becoming 




What does it mean to be brave? Are mothers brave for having children? Is a fireman brave for 
going into a burning building? Are lions brave when they take down an antelope? Is anyone who 




Is it wrong to deceive? Is it wrong to lie to a murderer about the location of his intended 
innocent victim? Is it wrong to tell Granny that she looks lovely when you think she doesn’t? Is it 
wrong for parents to lie to their children about Santa Claus? Is it wrong for corporations to lie about 
the benefits of their products?  
 
The above demonstrates, incontestably we believe, that attempting to answer questions like 
“what does it means to be brave?” or “Is it wrong to deceive?” in and of themselves, regardless of 
context is, quite literally, a meaningless activity. And, it is for that reason that it is evident that 
becoming “conceptually competent” cannot be a matter of simply learning what such-and-such 
concept means as a system of rules or, even, following Kant, how they might apply universally.6 
 
We have argued here that becoming “conceptually competent” (rather than acquiring 
knowledge or learning a simple application formula) requires (a) that one is motivated to get the 
application of essentially variable value concepts right, particularly with respect to context; (b) that 
one understands that the application of contextualized value concepts requires reasoned negotiation 
in public space; (c) that, for that reason, one is open to reasoned alternatives to one’s own and one 
shows an intense sensitivity to context; and (d) that one is able to utilize basic logical skills so as to 
distinguish between good and poor reasons in support of alternative viewpoints, all the while, being 
highly sensitive to context. 
 
We have further argued that Philosophy for Children is well placed to enhance conceptual 
competence, particularly if the questions that anchor the Community of Philosophical Inquiry are 
context specific and are such that they can ladder-up into target value concepts.  
 








What is particularly important to remember about all the above is that it demonstrates that 
conceptual analysis is not the sole prevue of arcane academic philosophy, but is, rather, the 
responsibility of all agents. If we can keep this in mind, it will go a long way to spur those of us 
involved in the practice of P4C to try to ensure that that practice is relevant to its core; and, to that 
degree, we as educators, will, at least in some measure, have fulfilled our responsibility for enhancing 
the agency of those in our charge.  
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1 To sense and to organize means to establish differences. We can also see this in the philosophical notion of 
critique (kritein in Greek), which means making a distinction. 
2 Critique of Pure Reason (A51, B75). 
3 See Gertrude Stein’s Geography and Plays (1922). This sentence is from the poem ‘Sacred Family’. 
4 Though there are other concepts, other than value concepts, that are also up for grabs, e.g., typical 
philosophical concepts like “mind.” The analysis of these sorts of concepts, however, cannot so easily be 
described as critical for ordinary agency.   









5 Thus, in discussing Deleuze and Guattari, Bell writes “The objectivity of our claim, in other words, will be 
simultaneous to the subjective conditions of the grasp of this objectivity rather than it being understood, as it 
was traditionally, as the recognition of a truth that pre-existed our grasp of it. Instead of the independent 
objectivity of truth, it is consequently the certainty of our subjective grasp that becomes the benchmark of 
objectivity (50).  
6 It is of note what a difference it would have made had Kant suggested that we attempt to universalize a 
“situated concept,” rather than a concept per se, e.g., asking yourself if you can universalize the maxim of lying 
to a murderer about the location of his intended innocent victim, versus asking yourself if you can universalize 
lying. This, interestingly, echoes “Sartre’s critique of Kant’s claim that moral conduct consists in obeying 
abstractly knowable maxims valid independently of situation, that is, independent of the historical, social, and 
political time and place” (Linesbard 65). 
 
 
Address Correspondence to:  
Dr. Susan T. Gardner  
Professor of Philosophy, Capilano University 
2055 Purcell Way 
North Vancouver, BC 
Canada, V7J 3H5 
sgardner@capilanou.ca 
 
 
